Forum: North Atlantic Treaty Organization

Question of: Reacting to the Aggressive Behavior of the Russian Federation toward its Neighboring Countries



Submitted by: Bulgaria

Co-submitted by: Albania, Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece,

Hungary, Italy, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, Turkey, United Kingdom

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization,

Acknowledging that Bulgaria is fully dependent on Russian gas and struggling to diversify and lower its dependence on the Kremlin in which 87% of the domestic gas consumption is covered by Russia's state-owned gas producer Gazprom,

Observing that Russia has no incentive to stop its hostile actions which can be attributed to the fact that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and European Union are failing to come up with concrete deterring measures hence it does not feel a strong retaliation,

Fully alarmed by the fact that Russian military is actively provoking the Baltic Republics,

Deeply concerned with the disinformation campaigns conducted by Russia which are aimed at undermining trust in democratic institutions and civic cohesion as well as destabilizing state infrastructure, democratic processes and other key public services,

Noting with satisfaction actions that are carried out by relevant NGOs and governmental organizations upon the issue,

Congratulating the United States of America and United Kingdom for leading the deterrent punishment for Russia's aggression while many countries - mainly in Western and Southern Europe - are hesitant to respond to Russia's aggressive behavior which poses a threat both on a national and international level,

Expecting member states to work tandemly in order to react to Russia's behavior in an efficient and concrete manner,

- <u>Urges</u> member states to obtain exchange and publicize data about the Russian interference, tactics and its reach thus informing the public about the Russian threat and acquiring adequate information to develop sound policies, in which Member states will:
 - establish investigative panels under their national parliaments to collect and publicize evidence of Moscow's disinformation and influence operations, in which:
 - i. each member state will be responsible for their own investigative panel,
 - ii. member states are not allowed to interfere with each other's investigative process unless allowed to do so by the state itself,
 - iii. in case a member state demands help for the forming of the panel, third-party establishments such as the East StarCom Task Force will be authorized to provide support,

 b. jointly conduct targeted research to obtain data on which demographic groups typically believe the Kremlin's disinformation narratives,

- exchange the information that are obtained from such actions in the annual meetings to enhance policies in order to be protected against Russian interference,
- d. work tandemly with the European Union and relevant governmental and nongovernmental establishments such as the East StarCom Task Force, the Hybrid CoE, the EU Hybrid Fusion Cell and Kremlin Watch,
- e. task their counterintelligence agencies to conduct comprehensive reports specifically about Russia's reach that do not need to be public, but serve governments to scale the level of infiltration of hostile influence into the national political arena;
- 2. <u>Recommends</u> high level officials both in the member states and National Leagues to explicitly recognize the aggression of the Kremlin in the political field in order to show the Russian leadership that its subversive efforts will not be tolerated by any means;
- **3.** <u>Proposes</u> to establish a framework between NATO Centre of Excellence for Strategic Communication and the EU East STRATCOM Task Force for the threat assessment of disinformation campaigns conducted by Russia, during which:
 - a. policies will be developed against Russia's disinformation campaigns with the shared knowledge,
 - b. joint trainings & awareness exercises for EU, NATO and national bureaucratic & political staff will be conducted,
 - c. Press conferences will be held systematically to raise awareness of the importance and urgency of the issue;
- **4.** <u>Encourages</u> establishing a Financial Snap Unit residing within the NATO, which could, in close cooperation with allied states, freeze the assets of the Russian state and the transactions of selected individuals or institutions of the Russian Federation in a matter of hours, if a strategic crisis were to emerge, in which:
 - a. the establishment of the Unit will be with the cooperation of Edward Lucas upon core aspects of the Unit, alongside their functionality and setting their magnitude or further elaboration and/or crises,
 - b. the unit will be used if authorized by the majority of the states, if that is not the case then regular legal tools will be used;
- 5. <u>Further recommends</u> member states to establish legal frameworks which would prohibit and punish non-transparent funding of activities of political parties or political candidates thus preventing Kremlin's financial support to the pro-Russian parties in order to destabilize the country;
- **6.** <u>Suggests</u> member states to form their own Disinformation Analysis Team free from self-censorship which will be tasked to regularly follow media coverage and react in real-time to developing disinformation cases that potentially poses a significant threat to the public or to the national security, which will:
 - a. consist of trusted professionals from various different governmental and nongovernmental bodies to merge the expertise and mindsets of:
 - i. the Foreign Ministry,
 - ii. the Defense Ministry,

92	iii. the Interior Ministry,
93	iv. the Army,
94	v. the Police and all national intelligence services,
95	vi. the press,
96	vii. freedom of speech advocates
97	b. be headed by either:
98	 a member of a freedom of speech organization,
99	ii. a respected legal scholar,
100	iii. a respected journalist;
101	c. react to the disinformation breaches by notifying the relevant state bodies,
102	while not, in any case, creating "its own propaganda" or censorship,
103	d. comprehensively analyze after each detected disinformation campaign upon,
104	among other:
105	 i. whether the campaign was successful or not and its reasoning,
106	ii. if the team dealt with the breach effectively,
107	iii. what could be done to prevent a similar threat,
108	e. work within the international network, established within the NATO and shared
109	with the EU, for analytical categorization of the disinformation, thus state pro-
110	fessionals will have a framework for the categorization of the reported cases
111	and can detect which of them pose potential danger and stronger impact,
112	such categorization will provide a strong database, hence allowing the mem-
113	ber states to predict and respond to disinformation campaigns better,
114	f. monitored by the relevant Human Rights organizations to ensure that the
115	team is not being used by the governments to silence the voices raised
116	against the governments without any justified reason;
117	7. <u>Invites</u> European Parliament to empower its only body East STRATCOM Task Force,
118	which is tasked to protect the EU from Russia's disinformation campaigns, by provid-
119	ing additional financial, technological and human assets which are already requested
120	in the previous annual report of the Task Force, such empowerment will allow it to ful-
121	fil its mandate adequately;
122	8. Recommends member states, specifically the ones that heavily rely on Russian gas,
123	to revise, and if necessary, make proper adjustments to their natural gas network and
124	policies with the aim of improving the infrastructure quality, thus minimizing depend-
125	ence on Russian gas by working closely with inter alia:
126	a. Energy Union,
127	b. UNECE,
128	c. IRENA,
129	d. IEA,
130	e. UN-Energy;
131	O Become and that the costs according the measures is noted to will be weld by the
132	9. Recommends that the costs caused by the measures in point 8 will be paid by the
133	willing member states as well as the institutions mentioned in 8;
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135	10. Encourages member states which are victims of Russian aggression to put forth
136	their case to the ICJ:
137	a. with necessary funding being provided by other states with enough funding,
138	b. during which temporary safety will be ensured by member states to prevent
139 140	the harming of the civilian population or national economy, such support will include inter alia:
140 141	i. possibility of subsidy for major company,
141 142	ii. possibility of military assist,
142	iii. possibility of financial support,
140	iii. possibility of ilitaticial support,

144	iv. and more to be agreed upon;
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146	11. Encourages countries to improve their cyber-security measures by:
147	a. allocating an adequate budget upon the matter and if necessary, provide fi-
148	nancial support to the member states that requests it,
149	b. providing assistance to the member states whom are not sufficiently equipped
150	with dealing such aforementioned measures, thus ensuring an environment
151	for them to set up cyber-security measures, such measures will include, inter
152	alia:
153	i. sufficiently trained personnel,
154	ii. technological support,
155	iii. financial support,
156	c. contributing countries have to be annually reconciled publicly by the organiza-

- **12.** <u>Calls for</u> Russia to decrease their military presence within the territory of Ukraine and withdraw their support of the insurgent groups in Ukraine, in exchange for the cessation of sanctions, in which:
 - NATO will decrease particular sanctions to begin a mutual relationship in which Russia would be expected to retreat an amount of their presence in the Donbass region within an agreed-upon time,
 - b. depending on the success in the Donbass region, more sanctions will be decreased by NATO in exchange for further withdrawal,
 - c. same operations will be executed in the Crimean Peninsula, and later summits will be held to discuss the future steps,
 - d. these operations will be monitored by Joint Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (JISR), operations conducted in the Donbass region are trials which will be used to develop and implement better policies and plans;
- 13. <u>Recommends</u> that the sanctions will be increased and doubled if necessary, in case Russia does not follow agreed terms between NATO and Russia, as long as NATO member countries do not get harmed by the aforementioned sanctioned;
- **14.** <u>Calls for</u> an annulment of all sanctions against Russia, if NATO agrees after a sevenyear time frame that Russian behavior has changed for the better and has worked actively with NATO;
- **15. Decides** to remain actively seized of the matter.

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