

Forum: General Assembly's First Committee

Question of: Tackling the Threat of Biological and Chemical Weapons

Submitted by: United Kingdom



Co-submitted by: Afghanistan, Angola, Australia, Bahamas, Barbados, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Bulgaria, Cabo Verde, Cameroon, Canada, Comoros, Croatia, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Estonia, Finland, FYR Macedonia, Gambia, Germany, Grenada, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Hungary, Iceland, India, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kiribati, Kyrgyzstan, Libya, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxemburg, Micronesia, Mongolia, Morocco, Namibia, Netherlands, Oman, Panama, Peru, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Romania, Senegal, Seychelles, Slovenia, Thailand, Turkey, Tuvalu, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United States of America, Uruguay, Yemen

- 1 General Assembly First,
- 2 *Remembering* of the potential damage of biological and chemical weaponry, as seen in World War I,
- 3 Armenia and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam,
- 4 *Noting* the political instability in the wider Middle East and its potential effects on the spread of
- 5 biological and chemical weapons in the region,
- 6 *Identifying* the wider Middle East as the nations of: Afghanistan, Algeria, Bahrain, Cyprus, Djibouti,
- 7 Egypt, Iran, Iraq Israel, Jordan Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, Pakistan, Palestine, Qatar,
- 8 Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey, UAE, Yemen, and Oman,
- 9 *Bearing* in mind the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and the Geneva Protocol,
- 10 *Noting* that any nation that does not comply with the mandates of the aforementioned agreements is
- 11 breaking international law,
- 12 *Recalling* March 15th, 2011, the beginning of the Civil War in the Syrian Arab Republic after the violent
- 13 repression of civil rights protests,
- 14 *Further recalling* the indisputable proof, as stated by the UN chemical experts, of a chemical weapons
- 15 attack in Damascus, Syria on August 21st, 2013,
- 16 *Reminding* all nations of the UN Declaration of Human Rights, in particular article 3 which claims
- 17 "Everyone has the right to life, liberty, and the security of person",
- 18 *Stressing* that banning chemical and biological weapons will result in a lower number of refugees coming
- 19 to other countries,
- 20 *Applauding* with the rapid international action taken regarding Syria's chemical weapons,

21 *Further applauding* the Syrian Arab Republic on becoming the 190th signatory of the CWC through the
22 aid of the Organization on the Prohibition of the Chemical Weaponry (OPCW),

23 *Deeply regretting* that the spread of the chemical and biological weapons and their associated materials
24 in Syria and the wider Middle East is due partially to humanitarian crises in those areas,

25 *Defining* that chemical and biological weapons are harmful agents used with the intention of inflicting
26 death or disease and any chemical substance that can cause death or wide-spread devastation to any
27 living organism,

28 *Recognizing* the devastating effect of chemical weapons and biological weapons during international
29 armed conflicts and their first wide-spread usage since World War I,

30 *Reminding* all member states of the CWC and the BWC which avert member states from developing,
31 producing, stockpiling, or otherwise acquiring, retaining, or exchanging armaments of this kind,

32 *Deeply regretting* that some member states have yet to ratify the major protocols and conventions,
33 especially the CWC and the BWC and to enforce theirs,

34 *Alarmed* by the availability of dual-use substances and existing stockpiles in areas of questionable safety
35 or political instability, and the possibility of their acquisition by third parties,

36 *Disturbed* by the fact that advances in the fields of microbiology, genetic and chemical engineering and
37 biotechnology may expose new potentially harmful agents and thus provoke further use of chemical and
38 biological weapons,

39 *Taking into consideration* that non-lethal forms of harmful agents, such as 2-chlorobenzalmalononitrile
40 (CS) gas, otherwise known as “tear gas”, are widely utilized against rioters dispersing any forms of
41 protest and thus posing a threat on society,

42

43 1. **Strongly encourages** all states who have not done so, to join the Australian group sign and ratify
44 the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC);

45

46 2. **Strongly encourages** all states who have not done so, to sign and ratify the BWC;

47

48 3. **Calls upon** all member states to acknowledge and support NATO’s CBRN Defence Battalion;

49

50 4. **Seeks** increased monitoring the OPCW and OPBW over facilities not only directly related to
51 chemical and biological weapons in order to minimize misuse of agent such as but not limited to
52 Riot Control Agents (RCA);

53

- 54 5. **Calls for** the establishment of an organisation called Organisation for the Prohibition of Biological
55 Weapons (OPBW) as a sister organisation to the OPCW, which would work under the following
56 guidelines:
- 57 a. Delineating that preparatory tasks would be necessary such as, but not limited to:
 - 58 i. Development of operational procedures of the OPBW,
 - 59 ii. Drafting its budgetary need,
 - 60 iii. Establishing a chain of command inside the OPBW,
 - 61 iv. Recruiting personnel to work in the OPBW;
 - 62 b. Its headquarters would be in Vienna,
 - 63 c. It would work under the governance of the United Nations Office for Disarmament
64 Affairs (UNODA),
 - 65 d. It would be financed by the Members States of the BWC based on a model from the
66 OPCW modified scale of assessment and by the NGOs willing to contribute,
 - 67 e. Its main goals would be:
 - 68 i. Researching efficient implementational measures of the BWC,
 - 69 ii. Supporting educational measures for firms using biotechnology regarding the
70 possible dual-use of it,
 - 71 iii. Organising conferences regarding the BWC,
 - 72 iv. Organising seminars and workshops in connection with biological warfare,
 - 73 v. Establishing international response plans according to national and international
74 law regarding possible need of reducing collateral damage by:
 - 75 1. Evacuation and temporary sheltering,
 - 76 2. Provision of protective clothing,
 - 77 3. Execution of decontamination procedures,
 - 78 4. Production and disposal of antidotes;
- 79
- 80 6. **Hopes** for a common effort to discourage any organization or nation from creating and
81 publishing instructions that deal with the production of chemical and biological weapons from
82 chemical and biological agents;
- 83
- 84 7. **Calls for** the establishment of the Chemical and Biological Defence Bureau (CBDB), an
85 organization that will work on par with the UN with the objectives of:
- 86 a. Improving the defence against biological of chemical weapon attacks by methods such as
87 but not limited to:
 - 88 i. Sponsoring the research on chemical and biological weapons by approved parties
89 through subsidies,
 - 90 ii. Supplying the approved parties with the necessary materials to conduct their
91 research,
 - 92 iii. Monitoring the aforementioned parties' research to minimize the risk of accidents
93 or a security breach,

94 b. Aiding countries in preventing the smuggling of resources needed for the production of
95 chemical and biological weapons by methods such as, but not limited to enforcing the
96 prevention of weapon trafficking through the implementation of:
97 i. Clear-cut definitions as to what illegal trafficking of chemical weapons entails,
98 ii. Suggesting harsher consequences to discovered illegal ownership stockpiling or usage of
99 chemical and biological weapons,
100 iii. Holding regional training in scope to include prevention of illegal trafficking of chemical
101 and biological weapons;
102

103 8. **Expresses** the need for a creation of a watch list composed of all the countries that have not yet
104 signed the BWC or CWC, or have signed but not ratified, the convention, with the goal of:
105 a. Ensuring these states do not use their stockpiles or WMD's against other states or their
106 respective civilian population,
107 b. Ensuring these states do not sponsor the proliferation of chemical and biological weapons,
108 i. Supporting terrorists with the development of chemical and biological weapons,
109 ii. Supporting other state actors with the development of chemical and biological
110 weapons,
111 c. Pressuring countries that have resisted signing the CWC and the BWC or have resisted
112 engaging in transparent dialogue to either sign and or ratify the respective treaties;

113 9. **Endorses** the continuation of visits by OPCW Executive Council representatives to facilities in the
114 possessor States Parties in the interest of transparency;
115

116 10. **Encourages** all States Parties to submit adequate and timely declarations under Article X of the
117 BWC;
118
119

120 11. **Suggests** that all future treaties and resolutions are constructed in an elastic manner in order to
121 a. account for differences in foreign policy between different nations
122 b. facilitate continued measures as the context changes over time by:
123 i. the emergence of a new world dynamic,
124 ii. technological and scientific development;
125

126 12. **Recommends** to employ sanctions against the individuals, political parties, and any other entities
127 which have been proven to store, produce use or plan to use biological and chemical weapons,
128 including:

129 a. Political sanctions, such as,
130 i. Inability to cross the border,
131 ii. Inability to participate in political life and elections;
132 b. Economic sanctions, such as,
133 i. Restriction to have accounts in foreign banks,
134 ii. Restriction to own or create new entrepreneurship;

135 c. Special restriction to conduct any kind of activity associated with usage of potentially
136 dangerous chemicals;

137

138 13. **Recommends** to employ sanctions against governments which have been proven to store,
139 produce, use or plan to use chemical and biological weapons, such as but not limited to:

140 a. Military restrictions,

141 b. Economic sanctions,

142 c. High fines;

143

144 14. **Suggests** that the ratification of the CWC and the BWC may result in economic and diplomatic
145 benefits later to be agreed on by the UNSC such as, but not limited to:

146 a. Funding for peaceful chemical and biological programmes such as, but not limited to:

147 i. The production of vaccines,

148 ii. Medicinal research,

149 iii. Industrial advance;

150 b. The lifting of previously imposed sanctions by the UNSC,

151 c. More confidence between nations that can result in:

152 i. Trade agreements between nations,

153 ii. Regional and global security;

154

155 15. **Decides** to remain actively seized.