

Forum: General Assembly's First Committee

Question of: Tackling the Threat of Biological and Chemical Weapons,

Submitted by: Niger



Co-submitted by: Andorra, Argentina, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belgium, Belize, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil, Brunei, Burkina Faso, Cambodia, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, Columbia, Congo, Costa Rica, Cote d'Ivoire, Cuba, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Dominica, DR Congo, Ecuador, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Gabon, Georgia, Greece, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Ireland, Japan, Kenya, Kuwait, Laos, Latvia, Lesotho, Liberia, Liechtenstein, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Marshall Islands, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Micronesia, Moldova, Monaco, Nepal, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Norway, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, Poland, Sao Tome and Principe, Serbia, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovakia, Solomon Islands, Somalia, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname, South Africa, Switzerland, Tajikistan, Uganda, Venezuela, Vietnam, Zimbabwe

- 1 The General Assembly First,
2
3 *Noting with regret* the countless cruel casualties as a consequence of the employment of chemical
4 weapons in the past in conflicts such as, but not limited to, WWI, the Vietnam War, and the Rif War,
5 *Emphasizing* the need for a concise and clear protocol regarding the employment, production, and
6 decommission of both biological and chemical weapons,
7 *Further noting* the past efforts, such as, but not limited to, the CWC and the BWC, to eliminate the use
8 of Chemical and Biological weapons from warfare,
9 *Recognizing* the ambiguities of past resolutions, such as the BWC and the CWC, on the topic of chemical
10 and biological weapons,
11 *Fully aware* of the fact that high amounts of chemical and biological weaponry have not been registered
12 or destroyed yet,
13 *Noting with deep concern* that chemical and biological weapons could fall into the possession of terrorist
14 organizations,
15 *Fully alarmed* by the weak protection mechanism of chemical and biological arsenals,
16 *Aware* of the fact that weapons of mass destruction have recently been deployed,
17
18 1. **Urges** all member states to cease all direct military development of biological and chemical
19 weapons and their respective delivery systems to prevent future weapons or direct research
20 regarding the construction there of being used by, but not limited to:
21 a. De-facto authorities,

- 22 b. Non-state actors;
23
- 24 2. **Asks** all member states who have not yet signed or ratified the BWC and CWC to do so, to
25 prevent the further use of biological and chemical weaponry agents and their delivery
26 systems;
- 27 3. **Strongly urges** all members of the General Assembly to contribute to the process of chemical
28 and biological disarmament by setting and keeping destruction deadlines for their remaining
29 chemical arsenals by:
30 a. Recommending countries to decrease stockpiles:
31 i. By a minimum of 10% in the next 12 months,
32 ii. Achieving total disarmament by latest 2030,
33 b. Ceasing the creation and or publication of instructions and or plans for chemical or
34 biological weapons;
- 35
- 36 4. **Requests** the prohibition of the production, stockpiling, and utilization of microbial or other
37 biological agents, toxins, or their respective delivery systems for means, types, or in quantities
38 exceeding those required or deemed appropriate for peaceful use;
- 39
- 40 5. **Encourages** raising the frequency of the periodic revision of the BWC, which is currently every
41 five years, to a biannual review, to prevent the BWC from becoming outdated during the
42 extensive temporal lapse between sessions to accommodate for:
43 a. an exponentially increasing rate of technological and scientific advancements,
44 b. an increasingly interconnected and fluid international network,
45 c. the increasing impact and emergence of new non-state actors;
- 46
- 47 6. **Recommends** all member states relocate bacteriological and virologic research facilities to
48 areas with low population densities, to allow for:
49 a. the reduction of pandemic risk as a result of a breach of containment,
50 b. improved response and containment of a breakout;
- 51
- 52 7. **Calls for** the creation of the United Nations chemical and Biological Weapons Taskforce
53 (UNCEWT), which:
54 a. Investigates and regulated the utilization, quantity, storage and production of domestic
55 chemical weapons (RCA) such as but not limited to:
56 i. Chloroacetophenone,
57 ii. Tear gas;
58 b. Establishes and administrates an international production database (ICPD) compiling
59 data collected from chemical production facilities producing riot control agents, other
60 chemical weapons or their respective components,
61 c. Create a section of itself, which has the means on the investigation on the employments
62 of chemical biological weapons such as but not limited to:
63 i. Employment of medical units in affect areas to determine or confirm the use of
64 chemical or biological weapons,
65 ii. Cooperating with local medical institutions to obtain samples from patients;

- 66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
- iii. Retrieving environmental samples on sites of attack,
 - iv. Conducting interviews with affected people and witnesses,
 - v. Analysis of data provided by the ICPD;
8. **Proposes** the creation of peacekeeping mission of the UN Peacekeeper core in order to grant the protection of chemical and biological arsenals which have already begun the process of disarmament and could fall into the possession of non-state actors;
9. **Encourages** the military support of countries who are not able to reduce or destroy their stockpile due to chemical or biological threats from other regional aggressors;
10. **Further Encourages** the Security Council to employ sanctions against bodies, governments and organizations proven by the UNBIECBW to produce, employ chemical and or biological weapons;
11. **Suggests** the establishment of local education boards in biological or chemical research facilities responsible for the education of the researchers and faculty of the potential duality of their work, to prevent the misuse of scientific advancements;
12. **Urges** member nations to ensure the security of chemical and biological waste dump sites to prevent the usage of chemical and biological waste for the creation of dirty bombs or other chemical or biological weapons;
13. **Proposes** to diminish the extent of the black market for chemical and biological weapons in order to restrict terrorist access to these weapons, by:
- a. Strictly monitoring any global stockpiling of biological and chemical weapons through methods such as, but not limited to:
 - i. Improving defenses against these weapons through methods such as sponsoring research on chemical and biological weapons by pre-approved parties and establishing facilities that work towards the development of defense techniques and tactics
 - ii. Having all research in the field of biological and chemical weapons by any and all parties pre-approved by the UNCBWT;
 - b. Calling for a limitation on the possession of biological and chemical weapons in any and all locations to be set;
14. **Decides** to remain actively seized on the matter.
- 66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
100
101
102